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Abstract: I argue that a study of the Nicomachean Ethics and of the 
Parva Naturalia shows that Aristotle had a notion of attention. This 
notion captures the common aspects of apparently different phenomena 
like perceiving something vividly, being distracted by a loud sound or 
by a musical piece, focusing on a geometrical problem. For Aristotle, 
these phenomena involve a specific selectivity that is the outcome of the 
competition between different cognitive stimuli. This selectivity is 
attention. I argue that Aristotle studied the common aspects of the 
physiological processes at the basis of attention and its connection with 
pleasure. His notion can explain perceptual attention and intellectual 
attention as voluntary or involuntary phenomena. In addition, it sheds 
light on how attention and enjoyment can enhance our cognitive 
activities. 
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Introduction 
Creatures like us can be aware of a wide variety of cognitive stimuli at the same time. 
We can, for example, listen to music while we read, or smell the pleasant scent of coffee 
while we think about what to write. Our awareness of different stimuli is neither 
uniform nor unlimited. Sometimes a stimulus is more vividly present than others: the 
musical background in a bar is less salient than the voices of the people we are talking 
to. Often a stimulus excludes competing stimuli: we don’t hear our partner calling us 
for dinner if we are engrossed in writing; we can’t write if there is a loud ambulance 
rushing down the road. These are everyday examples of the selectivity of attention. The 
selectivity of attention is often determined by the circumstances we find ourselves in, 
but sometimes it is voluntary. 
In this paper, I argue that Aristotle has a notion of attention, even though he does 
not make attention the subject of independent theorising. The lack of an explicit 
theoretical analysis perhaps explains why most interpreters have neglected Aristotle’s 
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views on this topic.1 Nonetheless, this neglect is unjustified. Aristotle uses specific 
terms to refer to attention: aisthanesthai mallon (to perceive more), prosechein ton 
noun (to pay attention, to turn one’s intellect toward) and ephistanai/epechein tēn 
dianoian (to concentrate, to fix one’s intellect upon). “Aisthanesthai mallon” is used in 
the context of perceptual attention, “prosechein ton noun” and “ephistanai/epechein 
tēn dianoian” are used in the context of intellectual attention. The use of a different 
terminology for the two cases, if my argument in what follows is right, does not imply 
that Aristotle has two different notions of attention. Both in the intellectual case and in 
the perceptual case, he sees the selectivity of attention as the outcome of a competition 
between psychophysical stimuli. This competition takes place in our sensory apparatus, 
i.e. the perceptual organs and the heart.2  
The selectivity of attention, for Aristotle, is a mental phenomenon in which 
certain aspects of one’s mental life, including perceptions, thoughts and emotions, are 
in the foreground. The selectivity, therefore, describes a structural aspect of one’s 
experience. Certain aspects are selected in the sense that either they become more vivid 
and salient or they exclude other aspects from one’s experience entirely. Characterising 
attention as a kind of selectivity may suggest that it is the function of a specific activity 
or capacity of the soul that surveys one’s mental life and picks out certain aspects of it. 
If my account is right, for Aristotle this is not the case. There is no internal scrutinising 
capacity whose exercise results in intellectual or perceptual attention. Similarly, there 
is no selective activity that picks out certain aspects of one’s mental life and brings 
them to the foreground. For Aristotle, certain perceptions, thoughts, emotions and so 
on come to the foreground or background as a result of the competition between 
movements in the sensory apparatus. These movements do not compete “for attention” 
understood as an independent capacity, they are not themselves objects of scrutiny. 
Their competition, however, can be biased as a result of some intellectual activities, 
like my effort to memorise a shopping list, and other non-intellectual activities, like a 
                                               
1 See however Hahmann (2014, 17-24). Hatfield (1998), following Neumann (1971), 
mentions Aristotle’s description of attention in De Sensu. Corkum (2010) calls ‘attention’ 
what others have called ‘consciousness’, understood as our capacity to perceive that we 
perceive. However, he does not analyse attention as a phenomenon potentially different from 
consciousness. 
2 The fact that the basic explanation of the phenomenon of attention is to be found in the 
competition between psychophysical stimuli and not in a dedicated cognitive capacity or 
activity explains why Aristotle discusses attention in the Parva Naturalia and not in De 
Anima. The focus of De Anima is on capacities of the soul that define the different kinds of 
living beings, like nutrition, perception and thought. Accordingly, De Anima does not discuss 
the details of the bodily background of cognitive phenomena. This bodily background is 
discussed in the Parva Naturalia and in the Parts of Animals. Thus, for example, De Sensu 
begins by stating that De Anima is about the soul by itself (peri psuchēs kath’autēn) and its 
capacities. In light of this study, De Sensu programmatically turns to a study of living beings 
and their common and peculiar functions (Sens. 436a1-5). 
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lioness’ hunt for her prey. Even in these cases, the process of biasing does not involve 
an inward scrutiny of one’s mental life. It is either part of one’s voluntary behaviour in 
one’s environment or it is part of an intellectual effort that can affect the workings of 
one’s sensory apparatus. 
I argue that his view can be uncovered starting from some observations on the 
physiology of attention in the Parva Naturalia. In light of this unified notion of 
attention, we can shed light on the relationship between enjoyment and attention in the 
Nicomachean Ethics. 
If my account is correct, Aristotle’s notion of attention is remarkable in its 
explanatory power, even if its physiological basis is of course out-dated. We can still 
conceptualise attention as the outcome of the competition between cognitive stimuli, 
even if we do not accept Aristotle’s views on the physiology of thought and 
perception.3 If we do so, we may still be able to endorse an Aristotelian principle of 
unity in the wide range of phenomena that relate to the selectivity of our mental life. 
1. Competing Kinēseis 
Unlike perception, attention is never directly at the centre of Aristotle’s philosophical 
analysis. For example, it is not treated as a self-standing faculty of the soul.  
Nevertheless, as my discussion in what follows seeks to demonstrate, we can 
extrapolate a notion of attention from his psychological works, in particular the Parva 
Naturalia.  
Let us begin our survey with the treatise De Sensu, where Aristotle describes the 
phenomenon of attention. De Sensu VII discusses whether or not it is possible to 
perceive two distinct things simultaneously. Aristotle thinks that simultaneous 
perception is possible but difficult to explain. Its possibility calls for explanation 
because simultaneous perception involves a kind of competition: 
If then the stronger movement always expels the weaker—which is why people 
do not perceive what is brought before their eyes if they happen to be deep in 
thought, or in a fright, or listening to some loud noise—this assumption must 
be made, and also [sc. the assumption] that anything is perceived more on its 
own than when blended. Wine, honey, and colour when pure rather than 
blended, and the nētē by itself rather than in an octave. This is because they 
                                               
3 Recent accounts of attention also envisage it as the outcome of the competition between 
cognitive stimuli (Duncan 2006). There is however little consensus on the nature of attention: 
Watzl (2017) sees it as the what structures our stream of consciousness; Mole (2011) argues 
that it is best understood as a specific kind of cognitive unison; Allport (1993, 207) denies 
that it is a unified phenomenon. For two summaries of the current debate on attention see 
(Wu 2014, esp. introduction and ch. 1; Mole 2013). 
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tend to obscure one another. This is produced from the things from which a 
unity is formed.4 
In this passage, the competition between certain movements explains the selectivity of 
attention, i.e. the fact that certain cognitive stimuli come to the foreground of 
experience. Some of these stimuli are perceptual, like sounds or colours. Others are 
not, like fear or thought. This competition has two possible results. Sometimes, the 
weaker stimulus is completely expelled (ekkrouein) from the perceiver’s awareness. At 
other times, the weaker stimulus is merely obscured (aphanizein) and the stronger one 
is perceived more (aisthanesthai mallon), it is more vivid and salient. The examples in 
this passage may suggest that the outcome of the competition to some extent depends 
on the nature of the stimuli. When the stimuli are in the province of the same sensory 
organ, like hearing, they merely obscure one another: the lowest note of the lyre (nētē) 
and the note an octave apart are perceived more vividly when played on their own, but 
they are not imperceptible when played at the same time. 5  When the stimuli are 
different in kind, the stronger stimulus excludes the weaker one from the perceiver’s 
awareness: people who are deep in thought, frightened or deafened by a loud sound do 
not see what is ‘before their eyes’.6  
However, one should not conclude from these examples that simultaneous 
perception, i.e. perceiving two different stimuli at the same time, is only possible when 
the two stimuli are of the same kind. Later in the same text (Sens. 449a3-20), the 
perceptual part allows the formation of unities between different kinds perceptibles 
because it is one in number, though different in account. Perception functions with five 
different sense modalities, but it retains a principle of unity, which is elsewhere called 
“common sense” (DA III. 2 and 7). Thanks to the common sense, we can grasp different 
perceptibles in a single unified perceptual act: we can simultaneously perceive the 
perfume of an apple and its colour, but we can also simultaneously hear a noise and see 
a colour.7 
                                               
4 εἰ δὴ ἀεὶ ἡ µείζων κίνησις τὴν ἐλάττω ἐκκρούει—διὸ ὑποφεροµένων ὑπὸ τὰ ὄµµατα οὐκ 
αἰσθάνονται, ἐὰν τύχωσι σφόδρα τι ἐννοῦντες ἢ φοβούµενοι ἢ ἀκούοντες πολὺν ψόφον—
τοῦτο δὴ ὑποκείσθω, καὶ ὅτι ἑκάστου µᾶλλον ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἁπλοῦ ὄντος ἢ κεκραµένου, 
οἷον οἴνου ἀκράτου ἢ κεκραµένου, καὶ µέλιτος, καὶ χρόας, καὶ τῆς νήτης µόνης ἢ ἐν τῇ διὰ 
πασῶν, διὰ τὸ ἀφανίζειν ἄλληλα. τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ ἐξ ὧν ἕν τι γίγνεται. Sens. 447a14–21. 
Translation adapted from (Beare and Ross 1991). 
5 On how the octave tends to be perceived as a unison see Probl. XIX.13, 23, 24, 35, 39, 41, 
42, 50 (Barker 1990, 2:92–93). On nētē see (West 1992, 219–20). 
6 Aristotle does not say, in this context, whether being unable to perceive what it is before 
one’s eyes involves also being unable to later on remember what was before one’s eyes. If he 
did, this might be a sign that he admitted the possibility of unconscious perception. See also 
Insomn. 462a19-25 and (Hahmann 2015, 21). 
7 It is not my aim here to discuss the nature of common sense, for the sake of this study of 
attention it suffices to notice that Aristotle thinks that perceiving two different perceptibles at 
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A study of simultaneous perception gives us some preliminary insight into 
Aristotle’s views of attention. Perceptual stimuli compete with each other. Sometimes, 
the outcome of the competition is a narrow focus of attention because one stimulus 
excludes or obscures the competing ones. In other occasions, we can be aware of 
different perceptual stimuli at the same time. 
However, this account leaves room for further speculation. First, Aristotle does 
not explain how non-perceptual stimuli like fear and thought can enter in the 
competition for attention.  Second, it is unclear why Aristotle characterises the 
competition between perceptual (and non-perceptual) stimuli as a competition between 
movements (kinēseis).  
Let us start from the competition between movements, which provides the 
background for the discussion of perceptual attention and intellectual attention in the 
following sections. The role of movements in Aristotle’s psychology is extremely 
controversial because in De Anima I (esp. DA I 3) he denies that the soul can be moved. 
Yet, at DA 408b1-18, he grants that emotions, perceptions and even thoughts appear to 
be movements: 
We say that the soul is pained and pleased, is confident and afraid, and further 
that it is angry and also that it perceives and thinks. But all of these seem to be 
movements. On this basis, one might suppose that the soul is in motion. But 
this is not necessary. For let it be the case that being pained or pleased or 
reasoning are movements, and that each of these counts as being moved, and 
that the movement is effected by the soul — for instance that being angry or 
afraid is the heart's being moved in such and such a way, while reasoning is 
presumably either this or something else moved … For it is perhaps better not 
to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the human being does these 
things with the soul; and this is not insofar as there is a movement in the soul, 
but rather because a movement sometimes reaches as far as the soul, and 
sometimes proceeds from it. Perception, for instance, is from these objects, 
whereas recollection is from the soul, ranging over the movements or traces in 
the sense organs.8  
                                               
the same time is possible through some principle of unity. This principle explains the unity of 
consciousness, for it explains how different cognitive stimuli can enter in competition with 
each other (Modrak 1981, 160–66). See further (Barker 1981; Modrak 1987, 133–44; 
Gregoric 2007, 130–44; Johansen 2012, 178–79; Marmodoro 2014 especially ch. 4.2). 
8 φαµὲν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν λυπεῖσθαι χαίρειν, θαρρεῖν φοβεῖσθαι, ἔτι δὲ ὀργίζεσθαί τε καὶ 
αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ διανοεῖσθαι· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινήσεις εἶναι δοκοῦσιν. ὅθεν οἰηθείη τις ἂν 
αὐτὴν κινεῖσθαι· τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὅτι µάλιστα τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ χαίρειν ἢ 
διανοεῖσθαι κινήσεις εἰσί, καὶ ἕκαστον κινεῖσθαί τι τούτων, τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαί ἐστιν ὑπὸ τῆς 
ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ τὴν καρδίαν ὡδὶ κινεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἤ 
τοῦτο ἴσως ἢ ἕτερόν τι, … βέλτιον γὰρ ἴσως µὴ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλεεῖν ἢ µανθάνειν ἢ 
διανοεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῇ ψυχῇ· τοῦτο δὲ µὴ ὡς ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῆς κινήσεως οὔσης, 
ἀλλ' ὁτὲ µὲν µέχρι ἐκείνης, ὁτὲ δ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης, οἷον ἡ µὲν αἴσθησις ἀπὸ τωνδί, ἡ δ’ ἀνάµνησις 
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The implications of Aristotle’s view that the soul is not moved are hard to understand 
fully.9 However, it suffices for our purposes to note that here Aristotle grants that 
perceiving (aisthanesthai), thinking (dianoeisthai), feeling fear, feeling confidence and 
recollecting appear to be movements. However, he suggests that if these mental states, 
activities of affections are movements, then these movements are located in the body 
and not in the soul. They somehow involve the heart and have some sort of 
directionality with respect to the soul: being angry involves the heart being moved, and 
so perhaps does thinking. Perception reaches the soul, recollection proceeds from it.  
At DA 403a28, Aristotle confirms that emotions like anger involve bodily 
movements, for example the boiling of the blood around the heart. However, he does 
not discuss elsewhere in De Anima the nature of the bodily movements characteristic 
of perception and thought. Instead, he focuses on the peculiar change from potentiality 
to actuality characteristic of cognitive activities (DA II 5). If we turn to the Parva 
Naturalia and the biological treatises, however, we find a more detailed physiology of 
perception. For Aristotle, the body of human and non-human blooded animals contains 
a continuous system of homoiomerous parts, i.e. parts constituted by a single element 
like air, water, blood or pneuma. This system enables the transmission of movements 
to the central perceptual organ: the heart.10 The movements originate from an initial 
contact between the peripheral sensory organ and perceptible objects (this contact is 
always mediated by external media like water, or air).11 Hence, we have good reason 
to think that these bodily movements are involved in the transmission of perceptual 
stimuli to a central sensory organ. This transmission is necessary for us to perceive, as 
proven by the fact that we can no longer see when the channels that connect our eyes 
to the heart are severed (Somn. 438b12-16).  
The role for these material changes in explaining perceptual awareness is hard to 
determine. Scholars looking at Aristotle’s views on perception have engaged in a long-
                                               
ἀπ' ἐκείνης ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις κινήσεις ἢ µονάς. DA 408b1-18, Trans. of DA are 
from (Shields 2016b). 
9 See (Carter 2018) for a recent interpretation, see (Menn 2002) for the many debates that the 
view that the soul does not move raises. 
10 On the heart as the central sensory organ see Juv. 467b28; Somn. 455a33-4. On the 
continuity of the system, see Somn. 438b12–16 
11 Here I follow Gregoric (2007, 40-51) and Corcilius and Gregoric (2013, 58-60). On 
homoiomerous parts receiving perceptual movements see PA 647a5-8; cf. HA 489a23-26; PA 
647a22-23; DA 425a3-9; Sens. 438b16-439a5; PA II 10. On the vessels, blood and pneuma 
that connect peripheral organs to the heart see GA 743b25-744b10. There is a debate in the 
literature concerning the role of pneuma and the blood in the transmission, see further 
(Gregoric 2007, 40-51; Johansen 1997, 91-93). 
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standing debate between so-called literalist views and so-called spiritualist views.12 
Roughly speaking, while literalists like Everson (1997, 84) and Sorabji (2001) believe 
that specific material changes are necessary and perhaps even sufficient for perception, 
spiritualists like Burnyeat (1995) take it that perception is in no way a material change. 
Aristotle’s account of the physiology of perception suggests that a radical spiritualist 
interpretation according to which there is no material change involved in perception is 
implausible, because material movements are at the basis of the transmission of 
perceptual stimuli, without which we can’t perceive. However, this is not sufficient to 
settle the debate. First, we do not have enough details about the precise kind of change 
that underlies each specific perception. Second, it is still plausible to think that 
perceptual awareness involves something over and above material movements, an 
immaterial perceptual activity or some sort of non-standard change.13  
For the purposes of this study of the competition between perceptual movements, 
it is enough to note that material movements are involved in the transmission of 
perceptual stimuli and that they are necessary for perception. In addition, through the 
mediation of phantasia, related material movements are involved in Aristotle’s 
physiology of thought. Phantasia and phantasmata necessarily accompany the exercise 
of human thought.14 Phantasmata are perceptual remnants similar in nature and content 
to the perceptions that originate them.15 Aristotle repeatedly calls phantasmata and 
phantasia “movements” (kinēseis): At DA 428b10-17 phantasia is a sort of movement 
that only occurs in association with perception and in beings that perceive; at DA 429a1 
it is a movement generated by active perception (aisthēsis kat’energeian). The same 
point is re-stated in De Insomniis (Insomn. 459a16-21), where Aristotle explains that 
dreams are phantasmata and that phantasmata are movements. He goes on to the 
describe the physiology of the generation of these movements as follows:  
What a dream is, and how it occurs, we may best study from the circumstances 
attending sleep. For sense-objects corresponding to sense organs implant a 
perception in us. And the affection produced by them persists in the sense 
organs, not only while the perceptions are active, but also after they are gone. 
For the affection in their case would seem akin to that of objects being carried 
                                               
12 A lot of ink has been spent on this issue, its initiator on the literalist side was (Sorabji 
1974) and (Sorabji 1992) and its first opponent on the spiritualist side was (Burnyeat 1992). 
For a summary and a potential solution see (Caston 2004). 
13 See further (Lorenz 2007; Corcilius 2014; Hahmann 2014; Kalderon 2015, ch. 8-9). 
14 DA 427b16–18, DA 431a14–20, DA 432a3–14, Mem. 449b31-32. See the section on 
intellectual attention for further discussion. 
 
15 Here, I do not aim to reconstruct fully the workings of phantasia, I just look at its bodily 
background and its role for Aristotle’s views on attention (see Nussbaum 1978; Frede 1992; 
Schofield 1992; Caston 1996; Modrak 1987; Wedin 1988; Scheiter 2012). 
 
 8 
[projectiles]. In their case too there is a movement even when the moving agent 
is no longer in contact with them. For the moving agent moves a certain portion 
of air; and that, on being moved, in turns moves another [portion of air].16 
Dreams, which are phantasmata, originate from the movements that are retained in the 
perceptual organs. These movements are present in our bodies and can propagate even 
when the perceptual organs are no longer in contact with the perceptible object. The 
transmission of movements is compared to the propagation of movement in water and 
air when an object (perhaps a pebble falling into a pond or a projectile being shot) is 
carried through. The movements characteristic of phantasia originate from the 
movements that make perception possible and are similar to them in nature.17 Hence, 
these movements are bodily, as proven by the fact that they resemble the kind of 
movements that propagate in air or water. 
Aristotle’s thesis that phantasia, perception and thought are, in a sense, 
movements is backed up by his studies in physiology. All these mental states and 
activities involve a bodily movement that takes place in our sensory apparatus and can 
be transmitted to and from the heart. This is why, in De Sensu, the competition between 
movements plays a role in the explanation of how perception, thought and phantasia 
can expel one another or obscure one another. With this physiological background in 
mind, we can return to perceptual attention and intellectual attention. 
2. Perceptual Attention 
At Sens. 447a14-21, attention structures our perceptual awareness: some things come 
to its foreground, others are pushed to the background. Perceptual awareness, in turn, 
is a complex phenomenon, which may or may not be reflexive:  
Actual perception is a movement through the body that occurs when the sense 
organ is affected in some respect. Animate things alter in the ways inanimate 
things do as well, inanimate things do not alter in all the ways that animate 
things do. For [inanimate things] do not alter in the manner of the senses; and 
                                               
16 Τί δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον, καὶ πῶς γίνεται, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸν ὕπνον συµβαινόντων µάλιστ' ἂν 
θεωρήσαιµεν. τὰ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ καθ' ἕκαστον αἰσθητήριον ἡµῖν ἐµποιοῦσιν αἴσθησιν, καὶ τὸ 
γινόµενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν πάθος οὐ µόνον ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις ἐνεργουσῶν τῶν 
αἰσθήσεων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπελθουσῶν. παραπλήσιον γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐπί τε τούτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν 
φεροµένων ἔοικεν εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν φεροµένων τοῦ κινήσαντος οὐκέτι θιγγάνοντος 
κινεῖται· τὸ γὰρ κινῆσαν ἐκίνησεν ἀέρα τινά, καὶ πάλιν οὗτος κινούµενος ἕτερον· Insomn. 
459a23-31. Trans. of Insomn. based on (Gallop 1991). 
17 See also (Scheiter 2012, 255-261). 
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[an inanimate thing] is unaware, while [an animate thing] is not unaware, of 
undergoing change.18  
Both inanimate things and animate things alter, but only animate things alter in the 
manner of the senses and are therefore aware of their environment, they perceive what 
is around them. This may be because the alteration happens in the sense organs, or 
because the alteration is of a peculiar kind, or because perception involves an activity 
over and above the alteration.19  Furthermore, awareness can be reflexive: animate 
things can be aware that they are undergoing change, i.e. they can perceive that they 
perceive.20 In light of these complex distinctions, one might suppose that Aristotle 
relies on a specific perceptual activity in order to explain perceptual attention and its 
effects on awareness.21 Alternatively, one might introduce a higher order reflexive 
                                               
18 ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν κίνησίς ἐστι διὰ τοῦ σώµατος, πασχούσης τι τῆς 
αἰσθήσεως. καθ' ὅσα µὲν οὖν τὸ ἄψυχον ἀλλοιοῦται, καὶ τὸ ἔµψυχον, καθ' ὅσα δὲ τὸ 
ἔµψυχον, οὐ κατὰ ταῦτα πάντα τὸ ἄψυχον (οὐ γὰρ ἀλλοιοῦται κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις)· καὶ τὸ 
µὲν λανθάνει, τὸ δ' οὐ λανθάνει πάσχον. Phys. 244b11-245a1. Trans based on (Wardy 1990). 
19 See the debate between literalists and spiritualists and its recent developments described in 
the previous section. 
20 I follow Caston (2002, 757) in taking the participle “πάσχον” (being affected) to be the 
thing that does not escape the notice of animate things. Aristotle describes this kind of higher 
order awareness at DA 425b12-25, NE 1170a29-b21, Somn. 455a12-22. See (Modrak 1981; 
Kosman 1975; Caston 2002; Johansen 2005). 
21 Hahmann (2014, 17-24) calls “attention” (aufmerksamkeit) the activity of perception that 
in his view explains awareness. In agreement with Bernard (1988, 141-142), he argues that 
this activity explains why Aristotle emphasises that it is possible for someone who has 
hearing not to be hearing at DA 425b26-426a6. Unless one’s perception is active and 
attentive, one cannot hear, even if something is “sounding” and there to be heard. This 
passage, however, can be interpreted otherwise. Its point may be to clarify that the actuality 
of the sound being heard and the senses hearing is one and the same, but their being is 
different (DA 425b26-27; cf. Shields 2016, 267-270). To show this, one may emphasise the 
difference between the potential subject of perception (a hearer who does not currently hear) 
and a potential object of perception (something audible which is not being heard). Hence, 
when Aristotle writes that not all potential hearers actually hear, he is not necessarily 
referring to their lack of attention. Even if an attentive activity were at stake at DA 425b26-
426a6, it speculative to assume that this activity could also explain the fact that certain things 
can be in the background or foreground of our awareness. Hahmann (2014, 24) rightly 
presents this as a possible extension of Aristotle’s view, which is not backed up by explicit 
textual evidence. Alternatively, one might think that attention is a special case of perceiving 
that we perceive. On this view, Sens. 447a 14-21 may offer a counter-example to Aristotle’s 
view that we always perceive that we perceive (NE 1170a29-b21). At Sens. 447a 14-21, we 
may not perceive what is before our eyes when deafened by a loud sound because we lack higher 
order awareness of our mental life, not because we are altogether unaware of what is before our 
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capacity, i.e. the capacity to perceive that we perceive, in order to explain why certain 
things come to the foreground of our perceptual experience.22 
In order to illuminate Aristotle’s views further, it is therefore worthwhile to look 
more in detail at other instances in which our awareness is structured selectively, with 
certain experiences coming to the foreground and others being pushed to the 
background. These include vivid perceptions, specific cases of colour constancy, after 
images and perceptual illusions. In all these cases, Aristotle does not appeal to a 
scrutinising capacity. Rather, he explains the changes to the structure of our perceptual 
experience as the result of the competition between movements. This suggests that a 
similar kind of competition can explain perceptual attention too.  
At GA 780a1-5, Aristotle discusses how one’s sight is affected by the constitution 
of one’s eyes. Eyes that are prone to be moved too much or too little with respect to 
their transparency and fluidity are unable to see well. In addition, one’s keenness of 
sight is affected by the competition between strong and weak movements in the eye: 
It [the eye] must avoid both (a) not being moved at all and (b) being moved too 
much with respect to the transparent, because the stronger movement expels the 
weaker. That is why people who have been looking at strong, brilliant colours, 
or who go out of the sunlight into the dark, cannot see: the movement which is 
already present in their eyes, being strong, precludes the movement which 
comes from outside.23  
Here we find another account of the competition between perceptual movements. In 
this case, the competition takes place in the eye and it explains why one cannot see in 
the dark if one has just been exposed to bright colours or to a bright light. The 
movement caused in the eye by the bright colours is too strong and it expels competing 
movements coming from later perceptual contact. As in the case of perceptual attention, 
the competition between perceptual movements causes the expulsion of a stimulus 
from one’s perceptual experience. The expulsion of the stimulus is an outcome of the 
competition and it does not require any specific perceptual activity or dedicated faculty. 
Perceptual attention, however, does not merely involve the expulsion of certain 
stimuli. In some cases, it is a matter of perceiving something more vividly, or 
                                               
eyes. If my interpretation is right, however, Sens. 447a 14-21 is not about higher order 
awareness or about perceiving that we perceive, but it is about awareness of our environment. 
22 An obvious candidate for this higher order capacity would be the common sense, see 
(Johansen 2005). 
23 δεῖ δὲ οὔτε µὴ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὸ οὔτε µᾶλλον ᾗ διαφανές· ἐκκρούει γὰρ ἡ ἰσχυροτέρα κίνησις 
τὴν ἀσθενεστέραν. διὸ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν χρωµάτων µεταβάλλοντες οὐχ ὁρῶσι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ 
ἡλίου εἰς τὸ σκότος ἰόντες· ἰσχυρὰ γὰρ οὖσα ἡ ἐνυπάρχουσα κίνησις κωλύει τὴν θύραθεν. 
GA 780a8-15. Trans. Based on (Peck 1942). On colour vision and the transparent in Aristotle, 
see Kalderon 2015. 
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perceiving it more. Unlike expulsion, vividness may be hard to envisage as the mere 
consequence of the competition between movements that takes place in the sensory 
apparatus. However, for Aristotle this competition allows for a wide range of results 
beyond expulsion:  
This is plain whenever we engage in perceiving something continuously. For 
when we shift our perception, e.g. from sunlight to darkness, our previous 
affection continues. For what happens is that we see nothing, because of the 
movement that was due to the light and is still subsisting in our eyes. Again, if 
we look for a long time at a single colour, be it white or green, then any object 
on which we may shift our vision appears to be of the same colour. And again, 
if we close our eyes after looking towards the sun or some other shining object, 
then if we watch carefully, it appears directly in line with our original vision, 
first in its own colour, then it changes to crimson, next to purple, until it finally 
turns black and disappears. Also, when people turn away from moving objects, 
e.g. rivers, particularly very fast-flowing ones, things at rest appear to them to 
be moving.24  
The persistence of movements in our sensory organs expels competing movements and 
thereby excludes competing stimuli from our perceptual awareness. This explains why 
we see nothing if we move quickly from a sunlit environment to a dark one. Sometimes, 
however, the movements seem to coexist generating phenomena like after images and 
the waterfall illusion. In this passage, Aristotle uses the competition between perceptual 
movements in the sensory organs to explain both changes in the way things appear to 
us and the expulsion of certain perceptual stimuli.  
After images, colour constancy and attention are different phenomena. However, 
at Insomn. 459b7-20 and Sens. 447a14-21 Aristotle appeals to the same principles to 
explain them: movements take place and persists in our sensory organs; these 
movements expel (ekkruō) and obscure (aphanizō) one another. The different outcomes 
of these competitions include the expulsion of a stimulus from our awareness, 
perceptual illusions and the gradual fading of after images. In all these cases, changes 
in our perceptual experience are explained neither in virtue of a higher order activity 
of a scrutinising internal sense, nor in virtue of a special activity of perception. The 
                                               
24 φανερὸν ὅταν συνεχῶς αἰσθανώµεθά τι· µεταφερόντων γὰρ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ 
πάθος, οἷον ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου εἰς τὸ σκότος· συµβαίνει γὰρ µηδὲν ὁρᾶν διὰ τὴν ἔτι ὑποῦσαν 
κίνησιν ἐν τοῖς ὄµµασιν ὑπὸ τοῦ φωτός. κἂν πρὸς ἓν χρῶµα πολὺν χρόνον βλέψωµεν ἢ 
λευκὸν ἢ χλωρόν, τοιοῦτον φαίνεται ἐφ' ὅπερ ἂν τὴν ὄψιν µεταβάλωµεν. κἂν πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον 
βλέψαντες ἢ ἄλλο τι λαµπρὸν µύσωµεν, παρατηρήσασι φαίνεται κατ' εὐθυωρίαν, ᾗ συµβαίνει 
τὴν ὄψιν ὁρᾶν, πρῶτον µὲν τοιοῦτον τὴν χρόαν, εἶτα µεταβάλλει εἰς φοινικοῦν κἄπειτα 
πορφυροῦν, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὴν µέλαιναν ἔλθῃ χρόαν καὶ ἀφανισθῇ. καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν κινουµένων δὲ 
µεταβάλλουσιν, οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ποταµῶν, µάλιστα δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τάχιστα ῥεόντων, φαίνεται [γὰρ] 
τὰ ἠρεµοῦντα κινούµενα. Insomn. 459b7-20. I follow Gallop in omitting γὰρ at b20 and 
omitting αἱ at b18. 
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only principles Aristotle mentions are those that govern the competition between bodily 
movements. 
The same kind of explanation is at the basis of an outlandish but related 
phenomenon: the possibility to have vivid precognitive visions and dreams. Aristotle 
thinks that most fulfilled dreams are mere coincidences (Div. 463a31-b11). However, 
at Div. 463b31-464a19, he gives some credit to a theory according to which 
precognitive perceptions in dreams might come from emanations from far-away 
objects. He attributes this theory to Democritus: 
When something has moved a portion of water or air, and this in turn has moved 
another, then even when the initial impulse has ceased, it results in a similar 
sort of movement continuing up to a certain point, although the original mover 
is not present. In this way it is possible that some sort of movement and 
perception reaches the souls of dreamers, coming from the objects from which 
Democritus derives his images and emanations. And however they arrive, they 
may be more perceptible at night, because those carried by day are more easily 
dissipated (because air is less disturbed at night, since nights are calmer). Hence 
they [sc. the movements] create a perception in the body because of sleep, 
because the small internal movements are perceived more when one is asleep 
than when one is awake. These movements create phantasmata, from which 
some foresee the future.25 
Certain movements propagate through the night air and reach some dreamers, 
causing movements in their sensory organs that amount to a sense impression, which 
Aristotle calls a “perception in the body”. This sense impression is then the source of 
a phantasma, from which the dreamer foresees the future. Internal movements, i.e. 
movements in one’s sensory organs, create a sense impression and are perceived more 
when one is sleeping. Presumably, by this Aristotle does not mean that these 
movements are perceived as movements, but that they are stored in our sensory organs 
and that they are attached to a vivid phantasma, or a vivid dream. From these 
phantasmata, certain people foresee the future.26 Later in the same text, Aristotle calls 
                                               
25 ὥσπερ γὰρ ὅταν κινήσῃ τι τὸ ὕδωρ ἢ τὸν ἀέρα, τοῦθ' ἕτερον ἐκίνησε, καὶ παυσαµένου 
ἐκείνου συµβαίνει τὴν τοιαύτην κίνησιν προϊέναι µέχρι τινός, τοῦ κινήσαντος οὐ πάροντος, 
οὕτως οὐδὲν κωλύει κίνησίν τινα  καὶ αἴσθησιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς ψυχὰς τὰς 
ἐνυπνιαζούσας (ἀφ' ὧν ἐκεῖνος τὰ εἴδωλα ποιεῖ καὶ τὰς ἀπορροίας), καὶ ὅποι δὴ ἔτυχεν 
ἀφικνουµένας µᾶλλον αἰσθητὰς εἶναι νύκτωρ διὰ τὸ µεθ' ἡµέραν φεροµένας διαλύεσθαι 
µᾶλλον (ἀταραχωδέστερος γὰρ ὁ ἀὴρ τῆς νυκτὸς διὰ τὸ νηνεµωτέρας εἶναι τὰς νύκτας), ἐν 
τῷ σώµατι ποιεῖν αἴσθησιν διὰ τὸν ὕπνον, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν µικρῶν κινήσεων τῶν ἐντὸς 
αἰσθάνεσθαι καθεύδοντας µᾶλλον ἢ ἐγρηγορότας. αὗται δ’αἱ κινήσεις φαντάσµατα ποιοῦσιν, 
ἐξ ὧν προορῶσι τὰ µέλλοντα. Div. 464a6-19. Trans. Of Div. based on (Gallop 1990).  
26 Despite the outlandish context, here Aristotle relies on his theory concerning the 
connection between perception and phantasia. As we know from DA 429a1 and Insomn. 
459a16-21, phantasmata are derived from perception, and require the preservation and the 
transmission of bodily movements involved in perception. There is however a discrepancy 
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the movements that come from Democritean emanations ‘alien’ (xenikai) and explains 
that they enter in competition with the ‘proper’ (oikeiai) movements that normally 
accompany perception. In normal circumstances, alien movements are impeded. 
Hence, they give rise to very dim visions or to no visions at all. At night, or in case of 
insanity, the competition with other movements is less stark and alien movements give 
rise to vivid visions. This explains why foresight is common among people Aristotle 
calls ‘insane’ (ekstatikoi): 
With regard to the fact that some insane people have foresight, its explanation 
is that proper movements do not impede the [sc. alien] movements, but are 
beaten off by them. That is why they perceive most of all the alien movements.27 
People in this particular condition experience a malfunction: the proper movements 
generated by the interaction between perceptible objects and perceptual organs cannot 
impede alien movements in the sensory organs caused by the Democritean emanations 
that propagate in the night air. As a result, they perceive alien movements most of all 
(malista aisthanontai). Presumably, perceiving these movements most of all does not 
involve sensing the changes that take place in one’s sensory organs, but it involves 
having vivid precognitive visions. After all, the phenomenon is meant to explain why 
insane people have precognitive visions. If this is right, the expression “malista 
aisthanesthai” captures the distinctive salience of perceptual attention by introducing 
differences in the intensity of one’s perception. The premonitory visions of insane 
people are more vivid and salient than their ordinary perceptions. This selective focus 
and this vividness characteristic of attention are the outcome of the competition 
between different material movements: alien movements create more vivid visions 
because they beat-off proper movements. 
This phenomenon has an analogue in the treatise De Insomniis, where the 
movements that give rise to dreams are obscured and often expelled during the day 
because of proper perceptual movements: 
From this it is clear that the movements coming from perceptions, both the ones 
from within the body and those from outside, are not only present in those who 
are awake, but also when the affection called sleep arises, and appear even more 
then. During the day they are expelled because perception and thought are 
active, and they are obscured like a smaller fire beside a big one and like small 
                                               
between his account of ordinary dreams and precognitive dreams, for ordinary dreams arise 
from remnants of our daily perceptions (Insomn. 462a29-30), while precognitive dreams arise 
from movements that reach our sensory organs while we are sleeping. In addition, we 
normally cannot perceive while asleep (Somn. 455b2-13). These difficulties may be 
explicable because precognitive dreams only occur in extraordinary circumstances. 
27 τοῦ δ’ ἐνίους τῶν ἐκστατικῶν προορᾶν αἴτιον ὅτι αἱ οἰκεῖαι κινήσεις οὐκ ἐνοχλοῦσιν ἀλλ’ 
ἀπορραπίζονται· τῶν ξενικῶν οὖν µάλιστα αἰσθάνονται. Div. 464a25–32. Translation loosely 
based on (Gallop 1990). 
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pleasures and pains besides big ones, but when these stop even the small ones 
come to the surface. By night due to the inactivity and the impossibility to 
exercise each part of the senses, and because of the hot reflux of heat coming 
from the outside to the inside, they [sc. the movements] are brought toward the 
starting point of perception28 and they become apparent once the turbulence 
calms down.29 
The purpose of this passage is to explain why the phantasmata that give rise to dreams 
and illusions are either very dim or completely absent during the day. Some of these 
phantasmata “come from the outside” because their origin is a previous perceptual 
movement preserved in the sensory organs (Insomn. 459a23-28). Other phantasmata 
come from similar movements that arise internally without contact with a perceptual 
object, because the sensory organs move by themselves. When this happens, we 
experience perceptual illusions (Insomn. 460b22-28). Wherever they come from, these 
movements are expelled (ekkruō) and obscured (aphanizō) by the activity of perception 
and thought during the day. This activity is accompanied by movements in the sensory 
organs that impede the movements associated with dreams and illusions. Thus, they 
can at best give rise to very dim illusions. 30 At night, however, perception is not active, 
and the movements are brought to the central sense organ (the heart) where, once the 
physiological turbulences stop, they become apparent.  
Here Aristotle’s point is not that the movements preserved in our sensory organs 
are, themselves, perceived. Rather, they give rise to dreams by night and illusions 
during the day. During the day, the weakest sensory movements are either completely 
expelled or merely obscured. This is a physiological mechanism that has repercussions 
on the phenomenology of our perceptual experience: obscured movements give rise to 
                                               
28 The starting point of perception is its central organ, i.e. the hearth (De Iuventute 469a5–7). 
29 Ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι οὐ µόνον ἐγρηγορότων αἱ κινήσεις αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθηµάτων 
γινόµεναι τῶν τε θύραθεν καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώµατος ἐνυπάρχουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν γένηται τὸ 
πάθος τοῦτο ὃ καλεῖται ὕπνος, καὶ µᾶλλον τότε φαίνονται. µεθ’ ἡµέραν µὲν γὰρ ἐκκρούονται 
ἐνεργουσῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας, καὶ ἀφανίζονται ὥσπερ παρὰ πολὺ πῦρ 
ἔλαττον καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἡδοναὶ µικραὶ παρὰ µεγάλας, παυσαµένων δὲ ἐπιπολάζει καὶ τὰ µικρά· 
νύκτωρ δὲ δι’ ἀργίαν τῶν κατὰ µόριον αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἀδυναµίαν τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν, διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῶν 
ἔξω εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς γίνεσθαι τὴν τοῦ θερµοῦ παλίρροιαν, ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς αἰσθήσεως 
καταφέρονται καὶ γίνονται φανεραὶ καθισταµένης τῆς ταραχῆς. Insomn. 460b28–461a7. 
Lines 28–32 are corrupted and difficult to interpret. Some read αἰσθήσεων instead of 
αἰσθηµάτων, some others read ἐνυπαρχουσῶν instead of ἐνυπάρχουσιν . Reading αἰσθήσεων 
generates an unnecessary contradiction with what follows, since perception is not active in 
sleep. By adopting Bywater’s emendation ἐνυπάρχουσιν we can avoid having two genitive 
absolutes in the same sentence. The version one adopts does not make the difference for my 
interpretation below. See further (Van der Eijk 1994, 202–13; Gallop 1990, 92–93). 
30 Here as in Sens. 447a14–21, aphanizō indicates that a sensory stimulus is dimmed and not 
necessarily cancelled by the competition with other stimuli. Hence, Aristotle is not 
contradicting himself when he writes that the movements are expelled and obscured during 
the day and that they are more present at night than during the day. 
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dim appearances, expelled movements to not make a noticeable difference to our 
experience. Hence, certain appearances are dim because they come from movements 
that are weaker than ordinary perceptual movements: they are obscured like a small 
fire beside a big one. Just as stronger movements give rise to more vivid experiences, 
weaker movements give rise to dimmer ones. Whether or not an aspect of our 
experience is salient or vivid depends on the competition between movements in our 
sensory apparatus. 
Aristotle describes the competition between movements in our sensory apparatus 
in a variety of contexts: attention in De Sensu, colour constancy in the GA and De 
Insomniis, precognitive dreams in De Divinatione, perceptual illusions and dreams in 
De Insomniis. In all these cases, the competition explains the exclusion of certain 
stimuli from our awareness, their characteristic vividness or their dimness.  
Perceptual attention can be characterised as a kind of selectivity because it 
involves certain features of our experience coming to the foreground at the expense 
other features. The selected features are either more vivid that then others, or they 
exclude them entirely: our friend’s voice can be more salient than the music in a bar, 
but we can also be deaf to it if we are listening to a song we like. We may envisage this 
sort of selectivity as the outcome of a higher order scrutiny of our experience. A certain 
aspect of our experience is selected and privileged at the expense of others because we 
focus on it.  
However, for Aristotle perceptual attention is not a specific activity that selects 
some aspects of one’s experience and focuses on them. Its selectivity is an aspect of 
our perceptual experience explained in virtue of a characteristic psychophysical 
mechanism. 31  Attention is the outcome of the competition between different 
movements in our perceptual apparatus. Sometimes, the stronger movement disturbs 
competing movements so much that it expels them. Sometimes, the movements coexist 
and give rise to simultaneous perception.  In other cases still, the weaker movement 
generates a dim perception, the strong one a vivid one. 
This reconstruction has the perhaps surprising implication that Aristotle’s views 
on attention are compatible with a wide range of interpretations on his account of 
perceptual awareness. To accommodate for his notion of perceptual attention, one must 
allow that bodily changes are necessary for perceptual awareness and make a difference 
for it. On the basis of this assumption, one can accept that the competition between 
bodily movements affects what is included in our awareness, what is excluded from it, 
what comes to its foreground and to its background.32  There might be other changes 
and activities that are necessary for perceptual awareness, for the material movements 
                                               
31 Aristotle’s description of the psychophysical basis of attention is strikingly similar to 
current competition theories of attention. In these theories, the mutual suppression of 
competing patterns of neural stimuli is at the basis of the selectivity of attention. See (Mole 
2012, 213 ff.; Duncan 2006). 
32 Thus, the only theories that cannot account for attention are the purely spiritualist ones (e.g. 
Burnyeat 1995), for they deny that any kind of material change is involved in perceptual 
awareness. 
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that take place in the sensory organs and reach the heart might not suffice on their own 
to generate a perception. These changes and activities may be background conditions 
for perceptual attention, but they are not part of Aristotle’s explanation of the way in 
which its selectivity structures our perceptual experience.   
3. Intellectual Attention 
Aristotle’s does not limit his discussion to perceptual attention. At Sens. 447a14-16, 
we do not perceive what is before our eyes if we are deep in thought (sphodra 
ennooein). At Insomn. 461a1, thought (dianoia) expels movements that would 
otherwise generate illusions. These examples suggest that, like perceptual attention, 
intellectual attention is a kind of selectivity that results from the competition between 
movements in our sensory apparatus. As I noted in the first section, humans cannot 
think without the aid of phantasia (DA 427b16-18, DA 431a14-20, DA 432a3-14, Mem. 
449b31-32). In turn, phantasmata involve, like perceptions, bodily movements (DA 
428b10-17, DA 429a1, Insomn. 459a16-21). The cooperation between thought and 
phantasia, therefore, backs up Aristotle’s view that intellectual attention and perceptual 
attention function in a similar way.  The intellect (nous) is not mixed with the body, it 
does not have a dedicated bodily organ and it is separate or separable from the body 
(DA 429a24-27, DA 429b5). However, since we cannot think without phantasia, 
thinking is accompanied by bodily movements.33  These movements compete with 
other movements and, if they win, they lead us to focus selectively on our thoughts at 
the expense of our perceptions, or our emotions.  
Despite this preliminary evidence, one might doubt that, like perceptual attention, 
intellectual attention is the result of the competition between movements in our sensory 
apparatus. In order to describe intellectual attention, Aristotle uses the expressions 
“prosechein ton noun” (to pay attention, to turn one’s intellect toward) and “ephistanai 
tēn dianoian” (to concentrate, to fix one’s intellect upon).34 These expressions may be 
taken to indicate a scrutinising intellectual activity because they emphasise how the 
intellect (nous or dianoia) is exercised or applied in paying attention. In this respect, 
they differ from aisthanesthai mallon (to perceive more), which describes the 
characteristic intensity or salience typical of attention.35  
                                               
33 See further (Van der Eijk 2005). It is difficult to reconcile this view with the thesis that the 
intellect is unmixed with the body. Perhaps, as (Cohoe 2016) argues, there are some high-
level thinking activities like thinking about divine forms that do not require phantasia. 
Another option is that the separable intellect is not really human, but divine, see (Caston 
2006, 328–22). 
34 See NE 1175b4, Insomn. 458b19, Insomn. 462a9, Mem. 453a 17 discussed below. 
35 Prosechein ton noun and other derivates of the verb prosechein are found in the writings of 
later commentators, where they often refer to a higher order activity or capacity that explains 
self-reflexive consciousness. Ps.-Philoponus In DA 464.13-467.12 reports that certain 
Neoplatonic thinkers considered the attentive ability (to prosektikon) of the rational soul 
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In addition, some interpreters have read traces of an attentive intellectual scrutiny 
in De Memoria,36 where Aristotle elucidates the relationship between thought and 
phantasia with an analogy taken from geometry: 
And thinking is not possible without a phantasma—for the same affection 
occurs in thinking that also takes place in drawing diagrams: for in this case 
while we make no use of the triangle having a definite quantity, nonetheless we 
draw a triangle with a definite quantity, and the thinking [person] in the same 
way, if he thinks of something which is not a quantity he places before his eyes 
a quantity, while he does not think of it as a quantity; and if the nature [of what 
he is thinking of] is a quantity, but an indefinite one, he puts before his eyes a 
definite quantity, but thinks of it as a quantity only.37 
Thinking with the aid of phantasmata is similar to doing geometry with the aid of 
diagrams. As geometers ignore some of the features of the diagrams they draw, so 
thinkers ignore some of the features of the phantasmata they metaphorically put before 
their eyes. The phantasma is of an object of a certain size, but they do not think of it as 
having a size. Since thought is selective, we can think of things like indefinite quantities 
even if the phantasmata we “put before our eyes” are of a definite quantity. One can 
connect this selectivity with the selectivity of intellectual attention: thought somehow 
expels or ignores the aspects of the phantasmata that are not relevant to its activity.38 
                                               
capable of surveying one’s mental life and of explaining higher order consciousness. See also 
Michael of Ephesus., In Ethica Nicomachea ix–x Commentaria, 517.14-16, who probably 
follows some Neoplatonic source. The expression prosechein ton noun is often found in 
Plato, but it is used colloquially to indicate the activity of to paying attention to what is being 
said and it is not analysed as a specific activity of the soul (see inter alia Euthyphro 14c1, 
Crito 46d1, Theaetetus 145a12, Philebus 31d2). The related term προσοχή is found in 
Plotinus, Enn. V 1.12.10-20; Stobaeus 2.73.1-5 = SVF 3.11, Epictetus, Diss. 3.16.15.1-16.3, 
Epictetus, Diss. 4.12.1.2-21.4.  
36 See Cohoe (2016, 358–66) contra Caston (1988, 285-286), who denies that this kind of 
intellectual selectivity is the outcome of a higher order scrutiny.  
37 καὶ νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσµατος – συµβαίνει γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἐν τῷ νοεῖν ὅπερ καὶ 
ἐν τῷ διαγράφειν· ἐκεῖ τε γὰρ οὐθὲν προσχρώµενοι τῷ τὸ ποσὸν ὡρισµένον εἶναι τοῦ 
τριγώνου, ὅµως γράφοµεν ὡρισµένον κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, καὶ ὁ νοῶν ὡσαύτως, κἂν µὴ ποσὸν 
νοῇ, τίθεται πρὸ ὀµµάτων ποσόν, νοεῖ δ’ οὐχ ᾗ ποσόν· ἂν δ’ ἡ φύσις ᾖ τῶν ποσῶν, ἀορίστων 
δέ, τίθεται µὲν ποσὸν ὡρισµένον, νοεῖ δ’ ᾗ ποσὸν µόνον. Mem. 450a1–7. Trans. of Mem. 
adapted from J. Beare in (Barnes 1991). 
38 There are other possible interpretations of this passage. Its point may be that thought goes 
beyond the phantasmata that accompany it, for example because it can extrapolate a notion 
of indefinite size from the representation of something with a definite size. If this is the 
correct interpretation, this passage is not about intellectual attention. I thank an anonymous 
referee for pointing out this alternative interpretation. 
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This parallel may suggest that in thinking one scrutinises the phantasmata before 
one’s eyes and selectively pays attention to only some of their aspects. On this view, 
intellectual attention is a higher order activity with our mental life as its object. 
On reflection, however, introducing a higher order scrutinising activity is not 
necessary to explain the relationship between thought and phantasia in this passage. 
Aristotle’s point might just be that our thinking activities require phantasmata as 
subservient representational states. A phantasma may have the power to supply 
different kinds of content to our thoughts, in the same way in which a diagram can be 
used for different demonstrations. When we think of a triangle we employ a phantasma 
of a triangle without employing its powers to represent a triangle of a certain size.39 
Here, we face a new version of the question that informed the previous 
description of perceptual attention. We need to determine whether or not intellectual 
attention is the activity of a higher order capacity directed at our experience. In this 
case as in the case of perceptual attention, it is helpful to look at the treatises on natural 
science. In what follows I argue that in these treatises we discover that intellectual 
attention results from the competition between movements in our sensory apparatus. 
Our intellect can bias this competition by initiating movements or by bringing them to 
rest. Hence, intellectual attention can be voluntary and up to us even if it is not a higher 
order capacity that scrutinises our experience.40 
In the treatises on natural science, intellectual attention is employed in 
memorizing and recollecting. For Aristotle, recollection (anamnēsis) is an intellectual 
activity that involves a rational search (Mem. 453a9-13). This rational search is for the 
sake of the recovery of a past perception or even of a piece of knowledge (Mem. 451b2-
6). The search ends when one reaches the starting point of a series of associated 
movements in the sensory organs and relative phantasmata that are preserved in the 
soul (Mem. 451b28-452a2). This series of associated movements unfolds until one gets 
to the one that needs to be retrieved (Mem. 451b10-25).41 The effort to recollect also 
involves an intellectual effort related to attention: 
That the affection [sc. recollection] is something corporeal and that recollection 
is a searching for a phantasma in something corporeal, is indicated by the fact 
that some people feel discomfort when, even if they concentrate strenuously, 
                                               
39 See (Caston 1998, 284–86; Modrak 1987, 128). Contra (Cohoe 2016, 354–55), I do not 
think that Mem. 450a1–7, 431a14–17 and DA 432a3–14 imply that the thinker is aware of 
phantasmata as representations. They just imply that the thinker is aware of the content of the 
phantasma and that this awareness can be selective. 
40 On the intellect and phantasia being up to us, see (DA 427b15–24, DA 417b16–26). 
41 On the associated appearances and on the workings of recollection, see (Lorenz 2006, 163–
73; Sorabji 2004, 94:35–46). 
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they are unable to recollect. And when they are no longer trying to recollect, 
they feel discomfort none the less. This happens especially in melancholics.42 
In this passage, recollection is a search for a phantasma that somehow takes place in 
the body. The effort to recollect is accompanied by intellectual concentration (epechein 
tēn dianoian). In recollecting, one sets in motion something corporeal (somatikon ti 
kinei, Mem. 453a22).43 This explains why recollection causes some sort of discomfort 
in people who are in certain bodily conditions, like melancholic people. 
The intellectual concentration involved in the effort to recollect, presumably, is 
meant to result in the selective focus of attention. Selective attention matters for 
recollection because recollection is successful only if one selects the correct appearance 
in the train of associations. The role of the selectivity of attention in recollection is most 
explicit when the effort to recollect fails. Aristotle thinks that people who suffer from 
a specific physiological condition (moisture concentrated around the heart) are bad at 
recollecting. These people are unable to stop the bodily movements initiated by 
recollection and they are similar to those who cannot control intrusive tunes, fear and 
anger (Mem. 453a23-31). In this context, the inability to stop bodily movements 
corresponds to the inability to direct one’s selective focus: those who are in this 
condition cannot distract themselves from their anger or fear, they cannot help thinking 
about the intrusive tune. Although they can initiate the flux of associated movements, 
they are unable to stop it. Hence, the ability to direct intellectual attention in the effort 
to recollect depends on the ability to control the flux of movements associated with 
perceptual activity. 
The analysis of the unreflective intellect of insane people at Div. 464a23-24 
reinforces this thesis. Aristotle seems to deny that insane people really have an intellect, 
for he writes that their thinking faculty does not think and it is, as it were, empty and 
vacant (dianoia ou phrontistikē kai hōsper erēmos). Hence, what remains of their 
intellectual faculty, which presumably corresponds to their sensory apparatus, can be 
set in motion by the nightly emanations that are responsible for precognitive dreams.44 
An intellect that functions properly is not empty and it cannot be moved. It stands still 
and it can control the movements that relate to perception. The ability to bring these 
movements to motion or rest determines the outcome of the competition between them, 
thus directing the focus of selective attention. 
                                               
42 ὅτι δ’ ἐστὶ σωµατικόν τι τὸ πάθος, καὶ ἡ ἀνάµνησις ζήτησις ἐν τοιούτῳ φαντάσµατος, 
σηµεῖον τὸ παρενοχλεῖν ἐνίους ἐπειδὰν µὴ δύνωνται ἀναµνησθῆναι καὶ πάνυ ἐπέχοντες τὴν 
διάνοιαν, καὶ οὐκέτ’ ἐπιχειροῦντας ἀναµιµνήσκεσθαι οὐδὲν ἧττον, καὶ µάλιστα τοὺς 
µελαγχολικούς· Mem. 453a14–19  
43 Cf. DA 408b15-18, where perception is a motion that reaches the soul, recollection is from 
the soul and it results in the motions or rest of the sense organs.  
44 See also (Van der Eijk 2005, 228–35). Contrary to his views in DA, Aristotle here seems to 
allow that the intellect of insane people moves. However, the contradiction can be averted 
because here he suggests that people in this condition are in some sense without an intellect. 
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Similar considerations can explain the role of attention in acquiring memories. 
For Aristotle, this process involves preserving a specific phantasma and its relative 
movement in the sensory organs. Some people are unable to acquire memories due to 
their bodily constitution. Once again, Aristotle distinguishes between people who are 
characterised by moisture around their heart and people who lack this moisture. Moist 
quick people and slow dry people do not retain memories. In dry people, the movement 
cannot be transmitted due to the hardness of their sensory organs. In moist people, the 
movement does not stick because moisture generates a constant flux of movements 
(Mem. 450b7-10, cf. Mem. 453a23-31). This rather peculiar account of moisture 
around one’s sensory apparatus suggests that retaining a memory sometimes requires 
bringing to a stop the flux of bodily movements that underlie phantasmata. This 
explains why Aristotle thinks that intellectual attention helps to retain particularly 
elusive memories: 
That we say the truth, i.e. that there are such phantastic movements in the 
sensory organs, is clear whenever someone by paying attention tries to 
memorise the affections we undergo when falling asleep or when being 
awakened. For one will sometimes, in waking up, spot the images that appear 
in sleep, which are movements in the sensory organs.45 
In this passage, by paying attention one can try to memorise the affections that occur 
while one falls asleep or while one wakes up. A side effect of this activity is the 
perception of certain images, which correspond to movements in one’s sensory organs. 
Similarly, at Insomn. 458b19, one can try to memorise one’s dreams by paying 
attention. The point of these mnemonic efforts is to retain the movements that are 
associated with dreams. If intellectual attention involves the ability to control the 
movements that accompany perception and phantasia, we can see why it helps to 
memorise dreams. The movements associated with phantasmata that give rise to 
dreams tend to be obscured by the movements generated by perceptual contact when 
one is awake (see Insomn. 460b28-461a7 above). In order to counterbalance this 
tendency, one needs the restraining power of the intellect,46 which can prevent the 
movements associated with perception from covering over the movements associated 
with dreams.47 
                                               
45 ὅτι δὲ ἀληθῆ λέγοµεν καὶ εἰσὶ κινήσεις φανταστικαὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις, δῆλον, ἐάν τις 
προσέχων πειρᾶται µνηµονεύειν ἃ πάσχοµεν καταφερόµενοί τε καὶ ἐγειρόµενοι· ἐνίοτε γὰρ 
τὰ φαινόµενα εἴδωλα καθεύδοντι φωράσει ἐγειρόµενος κινήσεις οὔσας ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις· 
Insomn. 462a8–12. Trans. adapted from J. I. Beare in (Barnes 1991). 
46 See inter alia DA 429a4–8, where nous can prevent one from acting on false appearances. 
47 In the pseudo-Aristotelian Problems Concerning the Love of Letters we find a related 
picture of intellectual attention (the picture is not wholly Aristotelian in that it suggests that 
the intellect can move, see (Castelli 2011, 270), on the author of these Problems see (Louis 
1993, Section XVIII)). At Probl. 916b1-19 and Probl. 917a18-917b3, readers ‘fix on 
something in their intellect’ (ereisōsi pros ti en tē dianoia), their intellect ‘focuses on one 
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This reconstruction suggests that intellectual attention is not the characteristic 
activity of a higher order scrutinising capacity. Rather, it is the result of the (potentially 
biased) competition between movements associated with perception and phantasia. 
The intellect affects the competition between these movements by bringing some of 
them to a stop and initiating others. Sometimes, the winning movement is associated 
with an appearance that we need to memorise or recollect. In other contexts, the 
winning movement is associated with an appearance that gives content to our thoughts. 
For example, in geometrical thinking, our intellect can rely on a plethora of 
appearances capable of giving content to different thoughts. However, the competition 
between movements is biased in favour of those movements associated with the 
appearances with the correct content. If this is right, the mechanism that underlies 
intellectual attention is similar to the mechanism that underlies perceptual attention.48  
On this account, intellectual attention is not the activity of a higher order 
intellectual capacity that can be exercised at will. Nonetheless, it can be voluntary. The 
thinker voluntarily directs the targeted selectivity required by recollection and 
memorisation. 49  We can make sense of the difference between voluntary and 
involuntary attention within the context of Aristotle’s general psychology. For 
Aristotle, some mental processes such as thinking or exercising phantasia can be 
voluntary and up to us (DA 427b15-24, DA 417b16-26). These processes, much like 
voluntary actions, have an aware perceiver or agent as their decisive cause and they are 
goal-directed.50 In some cases, the perceiver or thinker is not a decisive causal factor 
in the selection of the winning stimulus. The strength of the stimulus and a pathological 
psychophysical condition determine the outcome of the competition (Sens. 447a17-18, 
Div. 464b2-4). Furthermore, no purpose guides the outcome of the competition: when 
                                               
point’ (stē pros hen). Non-readers do not ‘think attentively’ (dianoia noēsē epistēsasa). 
Fixating on something, focusing on one point and thinking attentively while reading have 
different consequences for different people depending on their bodily constitution. In people 
who are in a natural state, intellectual concentration brings the intellect and the activities in 
its surroundings to a standstill. This immobility is also the cause of sleep. Here like in the 
Parva Naturalia, therefore, the intellect can restrain psychophysical motions. The focus of 
attention, however, is a cause and not an effect of this restraint. 
48 Aristotle does not explain how the intellect can bias the competition in the correct way. 
Perhaps this ability is connected with one’s familiarity with certain appearances and 
movements rather than others. See the next section. I thank Margaret Hampson for raising 
this question. 
49 Similar descriptions of voluntary attention can be found elsewhere in the corpus (Pol. 
1316b13–15). The history of voluntary attention becomes more and more prominent in the 
middle ages. See for example Peter John Olivi’s view that perception and arguably 
consciousness require an active exercise of the mind’s power called ‘attention’ (attentio). See 
(Olivi 1922–26AD II Sent. q. 73; III, 89. and II Sent. q. 58 ad 14 Cf. Quod. 1.7 (f. 4ra)). For 
discussion, see (Pasnau 1997, 130 ff.). 
50 See NE 1111b22-24 for voluntary action, for an analogy between voluntary action and 
cognition in Aristotle see (Corcilius 2009). 
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one is deafened by a loud sound or when one cannot get a tune out of one’s head, the 
selectivity of attention is not goal-directed. In other cases, the thinker or perceiver is 
the decisive cause that determines the outcome of the competition between stimuli. 
This happens for example when the intellect brings to a stop competing movements 
thus determining which one will win. In many of these cases, the outcome of the 
competition is also goal-directed, for it is the result of the effort to engage in 
geometrical reasoning or the effort to recollect and memorise. 
Even if most examples of voluntary attention are intellectual, it is plausible to 
think that Aristotle allowed the possibility of voluntary perceptual attention. Non-
human animals, who according to Aristotle lack an intellect, seem evidently capable of 
directing their attention voluntarily. Depending on the circumstances, a lioness may 
voluntarily focus on a potential prey or on the cubs. Aristotle describes a case of this 
sort: he argues that during the mating season male birds select potential partners and 
pay attention to them (prosechonta Hist. 614a22-26). The selective focus of these birds 
seems voluntary and goal-directed. In absence of textual evidence, we can merely 
speculate on the mechanisms at the basis of non-intellectual voluntary attention. First, 
Aristotle probably noticed that merely changing one’s behaviour or one’s location can 
influence the competition between perceptual stimuli. An animal can follow a scent by 
approaching its source, or it can move its gaze to follow its prey. In other contexts, the 
voluntary exercise of a faculty akin to imagination (phantasia) may be sufficient to 
direct the competition. A non-human animal can direct its attention to food or mating 
possibilities by voluntary calling to mind perceptual appearances (phantasmata) and 
stirring up their associated movements. 51  These movements may succeed in the 
competition with other movements that affect the animal’s sensory organs at the same 
time. An imaginative exercise of this sort would be part of the animal’s goal-directed 
behaviour and it would have the animal as its decisive causal source. 
On the basis of this evidence, we can take stock and reconstruct a unified notion  
of perceptual and intellectual attention in Aristotle’s work on natural science. Neither 
kind of attention is a higher order capacity that surveys our mental life. Both structure 
our mental life selectively, both are the outcome of the competition between 
psychophysical movements, both can be either voluntary or involuntary. Intellectual 
attention, in addition, relies on the intellect’s ability to initiate movements in our 
perceptual organs and bring them to a standstill. When this ability breaks down, or 
when it is hindered by our bodily constitution, we struggle to memorise and recollect. 
The competition characteristic of attention, however, is not only biased by the 
intellect’s ability to control movements in the sensory apparatus. It can also be affected 
by one’s actions, one’s orientation in space and one’s imagination. 
The physiological details of Aristotle’s notion of attention are clearly out-dated. 
However, his views seem to be remarkably unified and explanatorily powerful. Even 
if we do not endorse Aristotle’s view on the movements that take place in our 
perceptual apparatus, we can still envisage attention as a kind of selectivity that 
                                               
51 At DA 427b15–24, exercising phantasia is up to humans. However, nothing seems to 
prevent non-human animals from exercising phantasia at will too. 
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emerges from a (potentially biased) competition between different cognitive stimuli. 
In so doing, we can capture the common aspects of voluntary, involuntary, perceptual 
and intellectual attention. In addition, we can develop a notion of attention as a 
structural characteristic of our cognitive system without introducing a dedicated 
capacity or faculty of attention. 
4. Attention and Pleasure in the Ethics 
Aristotle’s description of attention reaches beyond his works on natural science. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, we find an analysis of a particular form of attention, i.e. the 
concentration that arises when we engage in cognitive activities with pleasure. After 
having argued that pleasure completes cognitive activities,52 Aristotle describes the 
effects of this completion: 
This is also apparent from the way each pleasure is bound up with the activity 
that it completes. For the proper pleasure increases the activity; for we 
discriminate each thing better and more exactly when our activity involves 
pleasure. If, for instance, we enjoy doing geometry, we become better 
geometers, and understand each question better; and similarly lovers of music, 
building, and so on improve at their proper function when they enjoy it. Each 
pleasure increases the activity, what increases it is proper to it.53 
Pleasures increase the activity they complete. Cognitive activities become more 
discriminating and precise when increased by their proper pleasure. For example, those 
who enjoy geometry become better at it and achieve a deeper understanding of its 
questions. The same applies to those who enjoy other cognitive activities, like listening 
to music or even building.54 
                                               
52 This discussion of pleasure is famously difficult to reconcile with Aristotle’s views in NE 
vii 10–12 and his views in the Rhetoric i. 11. These difficulties need not concern us here, for 
the focus of the discussion is the relationship between pleasure and attention. See further 
(Harte 2014). 
53 φανείη δ’ ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνῳκειῶσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἑκάστην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἣν τελειοῖ. 
συναύξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ οἰκεία ἡδονή. µᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν 
οἱ µεθ’ ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες, οἷον γεωµετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες τῷ γεωµετρεῖν, καὶ 
κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα µᾶλλον, ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόµουσοι καὶ φιλοικοδόµοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόασιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ· συναύξουσι δὲ αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ 
συναύξοντα οἰκεῖα· NE 1175a29–36. Translations of the NE are based, sometimes loosely, 
on (Irwin 1999). 
54 Building might strike us as an odd example of intellectual or perceptual activity. However, 
Aristotle here has in mind the craft of building, which is a productive state involving reason 
(NE 1140a10-16). See further (Harte 2014, 208) and the Platonic analogue at Phil. 56e8, Phil. 
56a3, Phil. 56b8, Phil. 56a5.  
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Pleasure makes cognitive activities more precise and discriminating because 
enjoyed activities are engrossing. The music lover is absorbed in the melody she enjoys 
and the geometer is engrossed in the problem she is trying to solve. The cognitive 
stimuli that matter for each activity we enjoy are vivid, competing stimuli are expelled. 
This implies that the right kind of pleasure improves our cognitive activities because it 
narrows the focus of our attention. This suggestion is confirmed in the following lines, 
where enjoyment and pleasure influence the competition for attention between 
different cognitive activities: 
For lovers of auloi cannot pay attention (prosechein) to a conversation if they 
catch the sound of someone playing the aulos, because they enjoy aulos playing 
more than their present activity; and so the pleasure proper to aulos playing 
destroys the activity of conversation.55 
Here, we learn that when one enjoys the sound of the aulos (an instrument similar to 
the oboe), one cannot pay attention to a simultaneous conversation. One focuses 
exclusively on the aulos and conversation is destroyed as a result. Aristotle continues 
by describing how pleasant activities tend to expel (ekkruō) other activities, so that if 
we enjoy an activity intensely, we cannot do anything else at the same time. If, 
conversely, we do not enjoy something very much, we get distracted and start doing 
something else. For example, we eat nuts at the theatre when actors are bad (NE 
1175b7-24). This suggests that the pleasure we take in a cognitive activity is 
proportional to the degree to which we are immersed in it. 56  Intense enjoyment 
excludes from one’s awareness the cognitive stimuli related to any competing 
activities. Mild enjoyment merely makes them less vivid.  
This description of attention and enjoyment is reminiscent of the Parva 
Naturalia. Aristotle uses one of his favoured terms for attention (prosechein). In 
addition, he uses the verb ‘to expel’ (ekkruō) in order to express the outcome of 
competing pleasurable cognitive activities. The most pleasurable activity sometimes 
expels competing activities and sometimes merely obscures them. Cognitive activities, 
therefore, are selected as a consequence of a competition, similarly to intellectual and 
perceptual stimuli. 
In light of these similarities, we can make sense of Aristotle’s views on attention 
and pleasure within the context of his scientific analysis of attention. At Insomn. 461a2-
3, pleasures and pains compete with each other. The stronger pleasure or pain 
overcomes the weaker one and it is therefore felt or perceived more. The fact that 
pleasures and pains compete like perceptual stimuli is not surprising. At DM 702a2-5, 
feelings of pleasure or pain and in general emotions like fear are accompanied by 
                                               
55 οἱ γὰρ φίλαυλοι ἀδυνατοῦσι τοῖς λόγοις προσέχειν, ἐὰν κατακούσωσιν αὐλοῦντος, µᾶλλον 
χαίροντες αὐλητικῇ τῆς παρούσης ἐνεργείας: ἡ κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικὴν οὖν ἡδονὴ τὴν περὶ τὸν 
λόγον ἐνέργειαν φθείρει. NE 1175b2–7.  
56 Gilbert Ryle discusses a very similar thesis in his (Ryle 1954, 142), where enjoyment and 
pleasure are a form of attention. 
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heatings and chillings that can enter in a competition for attention similar to the one 
between movements in our perceptual apparatus. Hence, it is plausible to think that 
Aristotle explained the way in which pleasures and pains become more or less salient 
in our experience in light of a competition between movements in our sensory 
apparatus. 
However, in the NE X Aristotle is not concerned with the saliency or vividness 
of pleasure and pain. The relationship between enjoyment and attention is less direct: 
pleasure leads us to engage in the activity in the first place and it fosters subsequent 
regular practice. If we enjoy an activity, we will desire to engage in it as often as we 
can. The opposite is true of painful activities: we seek to avoid them as much as we 
can. This explains why, at NE 1175b13-20, pain destroys cognitive activities almost as 
much as competing pleasures do. Competing pleasures lead us to disregard the activity, 
pain leads us to shun it. Engaging in a cognitive activity because we find it pleasant is 
in its own right a way to direct attention to it. When we engage in a cognitive activity 
because we find it pleasant, we affect the competition between the available cognitive 
stimuli in favour of those that contribute to the activity. The favoured stimuli, in 
addition, can be either perceptual or intellectual. Aristotle may have chosen the 
example of conversation and musical performances precisely because the relevant 
stimuli, in these cases, may be discriminated perceptually and intellectually. Both 
listening to a conversation and listening to music require us to discriminate auditory 
stimuli. They also require an application of our linguistic intellectual capacity and of 
our intellectual grasp of harmonic and musical development. 
In addition, with enjoyment comes practice and practice improves our cognitive 
performances, perceptual or intellectual. This specific kind of improvement involves 
the selective focus of attention. The more accustomed we are to geometrical problems, 
the more receptive we will be to the hints that lead to the correct solutions. The more 
practice we get at house building, the less will we get distracted by techniques and 
operations that do not contribute to our projects. A similar phenomenon is described at 
Div. 464a26, where familiarity with certain cognitive stimuli makes them more salient 
or vivid. We have vivid dreams (we are enthuoneiroi) about our friends and we 
recognise them more easily because they are familiar (gnōrimoi) to us. This familiarity 
has a physiological basis: the movements that are transmitted to our sensory organs 
from contact with familiar things are themselves more familiar and therefore have a 
privileged path toward the central organ of perception (Div. 464a30-32). 
Further proof that enjoyment and practice have similar effects on the focus of our 
attention comes from the Eudemian Ethics: 
It is clear that just as in science what we have recently contemplated and learnt 
is most perceptible because of pleasure, so also is the recognition of things we 
are used to, and the same account applies to both.57 
                                               
57 δῆλον δ’ ὅτι ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήµης αἱ πρόσφατοι θεωρίαι καὶ µαθήσεις αἰσθηταὶ 
µάλιστα τῷ ἡδεῖ, οὕτω καὶ αἱ τῶν συνήθων ἀναγνωρίσεις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπ’ ἀµφοῖν. 
EE 1237a23– 26.  
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Here, enjoyment makes what we contemplate and learn more perceptible, or more vivid 
and salient. Practice and familiarity have a similar effect. If this is right, enjoyment can 
bias the competition between movements at the basis of attention on its own and also 
because it fosters practice and familiarity. This improvement in focus makes us better 
at cognitive activities that involve careful judgement and precise perceptual 
discrimination, like geometry or the craft of building. Aristotle’s notion of attention, 
therefore, extends from a study of its physiological basis to the way in which its 
selective focus can be directed by practice and improve our cognitive performances. 
Conclusion 
Aristotle’s psychological works contain a unitary notion of attention. Attention’s 
selectivity is the outcome of the competition between movements in our sensory 
apparatus. Hence, the competition can be influenced by our bodily condition. In 
addition, our intellect has the peculiar capacity to restrain these movements, thus 
directing the focus of attention. Voluntary attention is not exclusively intellectual: 
voluntary actions and voluntary exercises of imagination (phantasia) can influence the 
outcomes of the competition. 
Aristotle’s notion of attention in the psychological works can also help us to make 
sense of his views on pleasure and attention in the Nicomachean Ethics. Enjoying a 
cognitive activity leads us to focus on it and to engage in it repeatedly. Enjoyed 
activities are in the foreground of our mental life and they are therefore more precise. 
Practice has similar effects, for it biases the competition in favour the movements that 
originate from familiar stimuli. 
Aristotle has a remarkably unified notion of attention and he brings together a 
wide plethora of phenomena characteristic of it: the selectivity of attention is always 
the outcome of the competition between stimuli that takes place in our sensory 
apparatus, but it can be perceptual, intellectual, voluntary or involuntary. In addition, 
it enjoys a close link with pleasure and practice and it can enhance both perceptual and 
intellectual cognition. This last aspect of attention lies at the intersection between 
Aristotle’s work on ethics and his work on psychology. Pleasure has a prominent role 
in moral education and it also enhances cognition by enhancing attention. It is thus 
plausible to think that attention has a role to play in the kind of cognitive training that 
is necessary for moral training. Thus, a study of Aristotle’s psychology of attention 
opens the path to a study of his moral psychology of attention.58 
Aristotle’s notion of attention is developed against the backdrop of his views on 
the physiology of perception and thought. Since Aristotle’s physiology is out-dated, 
we may wonder whether so is his notion of attention. This question is especially 
pressing because contemporary research challenges the view that there is a single 
physiological mechanism at the basis of attention.59 However, if we extrapolate from 
                                               
58 I discuss his moral psychology of attention in a paper in progress. 
59 See e.g. (Watzl 2017, 13–33). 
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the details of his physiology, Aristotle’s analysis remains insightful. It is elegant and 
economical, because it explains attention as a phenomenon that results from the 
integrated functioning of our sensory apparatus. It does not introduce a higher order 
capacity that scrutinises our perceptual and intellectual experience in order to explain 
the selectivity of attention. Rather, it relies on the idea that cognitive stimuli can 
compete with one another and that this competition has an effect on the structure of our 
mental life. This competition is intelligible even if we cannot explain it or reduce it to 
a single physiological basis. Hence, it may still prove to be an interesting candidate for 
a viable theory of attention.60 
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